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BANKRUPTCY IN RUSSIA: THE EVOLUTION OF
A COMPREHENSIVE RUSSIAN BANKRUPTCY CODE
PaulR. Williams*
PaulE. Wade"

When Mikhail Gorbachev began the restructuring reforms ofperestroika,he
envisioned creating a "market-based" economy within the Soviet political
system. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the reforms
originating from perestroika were accelerated as market-oriented policy
makers took advantage of the temporary disappearance of the communist
party and the emerging tide of public opinion favoring market reform.
However, despite their early enthusiasm to embrace market reform, President El'tsin and many other supporters of the move to a market-based
economy have shown a reluctance to consider the possibility of bankruptcy,
one perceived down-side of a truly free market.' Despite this reluctance, the
Russian Parliament recently enacted a comprehensive bankruptcy code.
This article traces the development of the current bankruptcy code, with
its origins in the early economic laws ofperestroika;explains key provisions
of the current law; and comments on the prospects for its effective implementation. The intent of this article is to provide a balanced understanding of
the Russian bankruptcy code useful both to the study of the emergence of a
market-based economy in Russia and as a bankruptcy primer for individuals
or corporations conducting business in Russia.
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I. President El'tsin's economic strategy can be characterized as a balance between the
pursuit of the most rapid transition to a market economy possible and the desire to avoid
losing public support for market reform, including the support of key public and military
figures.
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1. Evolution of the Concept of Bankruptcy
During the Market Reforms of Perestroika
The development of Russian laws relating to bankruptcy has been erratic and
occasionally contradictory. Economic laws passed during the early phases of
perestroika appear to mention bankruptcy as an afterthought, included
simply because it is a characteristic of a free market.2 As the difficulties of
moving to a market-based economy began to materialize in the later years of
perestroika, the new economic laws received greater scrutiny, and the
concept of bankruptcy in Russia began to take form around the five basic
functions of bankruptcy. The importance of resolving the issue of insolvent
enterprises eventually led to lengthy legislation specifically covering bankruptcy.3
In order to trace the development of bankruptcy law in Russia, this article
will briefly identify major Soviet or Russian legislation containing provisions addressing bankruptcy, and then explore the evolution in Soviet and
Russian law of the five functions of a rudimentary bankruptcy code: defining
bankruptcy, determining insolvency, establishing a process for reorganization or liquidation, establishing creditors' rights and priority, and discharging debt obligations.
1.1 Chronology

The Law on State Enterprises adopted on 30 June 1987 represents an early
attempt to reform the Soviet economy4 and, although marking a major move
toward the establishment of a market-based economy, the law reflects a
number of misconceptions concerning the operation of a market-economy,
particularly in the area of bankruptcy. The 1988 Law on Cooperatives in the
USSR, adopted primarily to regulate the evolving nature of cooperative
enterprises, dealt briefly with the bankruptcy of such enterprises.' The Law
on Enterprises in the USSR adopted on 4 June 1990 represented the first
2. The concept of bankruptcy was generally disregarded in pre-perestroikalegislation as the
Soviet law-makers believed that since the planned economy excludes most trading risks,
insolvency would not be a legal problem. A.K.R. Kiralfy, "Insolvency", Encyclopedia of
Soviet Law at 321 (1973). See also C. Osakwe, Soviet Business Law at 12-9 (1992) (In a
system where all major means of production and distribution are owned by the state, the
principle of bankruptcy should not be given prominence.)
3. The last few years have witnessed a steady jettisoning of socialist rhetoric and a continuing
refinement of Russian treatment of the concept of bankruptcy.
4. Law on State Enterprises, 27 Soviet Statutes & Decisions 6 (Summer 1990) [hereinafter
Law on State Enterprises].
5. Law on Cooperatives in the USSR, 26 Soviet Statutes & Decisions 65 (Winter 1989-90)
[hereinafter Law on Cooperatives].
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attempt at a bankruptcy code, constrained, however, by substantial reliance
on the principles of a state economy.6 In the months immediately preceding
the failed coup of August 1991, the Supreme Soviet enacted the Fundamental
Principles of Civil Legislation of the USSR and Republics, which attempted
to establish a refined legal framework for the genesis of a market-based
economy.7
In addition to this Soviet legislation, Russia enacted two significant
pieces of legislation on 25 December 1990, prior to the dissolution of the
Soviet Union. The Russian Law on Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activity
attempted to accelerate the establishment of a general bankruptcy code in
Russia,' while the Statute on Joint-Stock Companies established preliminary
bankruptcy procedures for joint-stock companies.'
1.2 Functionsof a Bankruptcy Code
The legislation enacted by the Soviet Union and Russia initiated the process
of shifting the Soviet economy from a command to a market-based economy.
The following examination of the evolution of the five basic functions of a
bankruptcy code indicates the uncertainty with which the law-makers launched
this shift. Although some of the shortcomings of early bankruptcy-related
legislation may have their origin in either a reluctance to shift to a marketbased economy, or an unawareness of the need for a bankruptcy code and its
necessary content, these shortcomings are important as a market-based
economy can only operate effectively when complemented by an operative
bankruptcy system.' ° A bankruptcy code will only engender an operative
bankruptcy system if it establishes an adequate legal foundation for the five
primary functions of bankruptcy.
6. Law on Enterprises in the USSR, 29 Soviet Statutes & Decisions81-82 (Winter 1990-91)
[hereinafter Law On Enterprises].
7. Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation of the USSR and Republics, 1992 Basic
Documents on the Soviet Legal System 104-5 (1992). The Fundamental Principles of Civil
Legislation, although adopted prior to the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, were not
due to take effect until 1 January 1992, by which time the Soviet Union had dissolved. "On
the Introduction into Effect of the Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation of the
USSR and Republics", 1992 Basic Documents on the Soviet Legal System 177 (1992).
8. Law on Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activity, 1992 Basic Legal Documents of the
Russian Federation 192 (1992) [hereinafter Russian Law on Enterprises].
9. Statute on Joint-Stock Companies, 1992 Basic Legal Documents of the Russian Federation 223 (1992) [hereinafter Statute on Joint-Stock Companies].
10. The primary purpose of bankruptcy is to keep resources active in a market-economy.
Capital is kept active by allowing creditors to liquidate a bankrupt enterprise and thereby
retrieve as much of their capital as possible, letting the creditors then reinvest that capital
in another enterprise. Human capital is kept active by permitting an honest debtor to be
relieved of onerous debt, and start a new enterprise without carrying over the debt burden
from the previous enterprise.
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Defining Bankruptcy

The first function of a bankruptcy code is to define what constitutes a
bankrupt enterprise. A bankrupt enterprise is generally an enterprise which is
insolvent. Insolvency occurs either when 1) the enterprise has debts in excess
of assets, or 2) the enterprise is unable to pay its debts as they mature.
The Law on State Enterprises defined bankruptcy as a systematic violation of "payments discipline."" The Law on Cooperatives provided that a
cooperative may be deemed insolvent if it "repeatedly fails to make payments." 12 The Russian Law on Enterprises provided that an enterprise may be
declared bankrupt "in the event it is impossible [for the enterprise] to
perform obligations to creditors."' 3 The Fundamental Principles of Civil
Legislation, although not defining bankruptcy, did define the concept of a
legal person, 4 hitherto undefined, and provided that a legal person could be
liquidated by a decision of a court in the event of bankruptcy. 5
Although designed to spur a move to a market-based economy, these
early attempts to define the concept of bankruptcy relied heavily upon the
6
staid concept of a centrally planned economy to administer the free market.'
The definitions of profitability and bankruptcy were the result of a wish to
direct profitability rather than define it, and as such were more akin to
aspirational standards rather than rules that could be applied through administrative determinations. As a result of their vague nature, such standards
could be manipulated in a highly discretionary manner and were of little use
as a building-block for establishing a comprehensive system of bankruptcy
useful for the operation of a market-based economy.
DeterminingInsolvency

After defining bankruptcy, a bankruptcy code must set forth a procedure for
determining whether an enterprise is insolvent. The two primary aspects of a
bankruptcy code relating to a determination of insolvency are: 1) which state
institution is capable of declaring an enterprise insolvent, and 2) what
11. Law on State Enterprises, supranote 4, art. 18, sec. 3, at 59. The Law on State Enterprises
requires all enterprises to function without showing a loss and that, in the case of temporary "planned-loss operations," the enterprise be financed by the "higher-level agency"
responsible for the section of the economy in which the industry was located. Id. art. 17,
sec. 4, at 56.
12. Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 23, sec. 3, at 65.
13. Russian Law on Enterprises, supra note 8, art. 17, at 192.
14. A legal person is defined as "an organization which has discrete property in ownership,
full economic jurisdiction, or operative management, is liable for its obligations with such
property, and appears in a court ...
in its own name." Fundamental Principles of Civil
Legislation, supra note 7, art. 11, para. 1, at 104-5.
15. Id. art. 17, para. 1, at 107.
16. This is most clearly indicated by the reliance upon the higher-level agency to fund shortterm losses of the enterprise.
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procedure must that institution follow before it may make such a declaration?
The Law on State Enterprises granted creditor banks the power to declare
an enterprise insolvent in cases of a systematic violation of payments
discipline. 7 The bank was then required to report this declaration to the basic
suppliers of goods and materials to the enterprise, and to a higher-level
agency. 8 The Law on State Enterprises also provided that in the event an
enterprise operated at a loss for a substantial time period despite taking
measures to remain solvent, the agency empowered to create the enterprise
could terminate the enterprise. 19 An enterprise could therefore be declared
insolvent by either a creditor bank, or the state agency responsible for the
enterprise.
The Law on Cooperatives placed the power of determining bankruptcy
for purposes of reorganizing payment schedules with the banks, and for
purposes of liquidation with the local soviet of peoples' deputies upon the
request of the creditor bank.20 The Law on Cooperatives did not, however,
create a procedure for making a determination of insolvency.2' The Law on
Enterprises departed from earlier practice and permitted liquidation of an
enterprise upon decision of a court, and provided for voluntary as well as
involuntary bankruptcy.2 2 The Russian Law on Enterprises adopted the
practice of placing responsibility for bankruptcy determination with the
23

courts.

Removing the power to determine insolvencies from the jurisdiction of
the central bank and local soviets (instruments of a planned economy), and
placing that responsibility with the court system (instrument of a democratic/
market-based regime) marked an important realization that bankruptcies
involve a balancing of interests both between the debtor and creditor(s), and
amongst creditors. Similarly, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary bankruptcies recognized that there may be a variety of motivations for
declaring bankruptcy. Unfortunately, up to this point there was no consideration of what procedure a court should follow in order to ensure an impartial
process, balance the interests of the parties, and prevent misuse of a bankruptcy regime.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Law on State Enterprises, supra note 4, art. 18, sec. 3, at 59.
Id.
Id. art. 23, at 65.
Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 23, sec. 3, at 65.

Id.
Law on Enterprises, supra note 6, at 8 1.
Russian Law on Enterprises, supra note 8, art. 17, at 192.
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Establishinga Processfor Reorganization or Liquidation

After an enterprise is declared insolvent, following the proper procedure, the
institution responsible for making such a declaration must establish either a
process for reorganizing the enterprise so that is may become profitable
again," or a process for liquidating the enterprise and allocating its assets
amongst its creditors."
The Law on State Enterprises provided that in the event of short-term
losses, an enterprise must "work out measures to strengthen its financial
position, to eliminate the unprofitable production of output (work, services)
within an established time period, and to ensure operation at a profit. 2 6 The
Law on Cooperatives provided that the bank declaring the cooperative
insolvent "will determine the cooperative's payment schedule until it is
restored to financial health."27 In the event the cooperative regularly registered losses, as noted above, the bank could request the local soviet of
28
peoples' deputies to liquidate the cooperative.
The Law on Enterprises provided that "an enterprise shall be liquidated ...
when it is declared to be bankrupt. '29 In the event of voluntary liquidation,
the liquidation would be carried out by a liquidation commission, and in the
case of involuntary liquidation, by the court.3 0 The owner or court was
responsible for establishing "the procedure and the timetable for the liquidation, as well as [the] time period during which creditors may present their
claims."'" The Russian Law on Enterprises, 3 2 and the Statute on Joint-Stock
Companies33 mirrored the Law on Enterprises with respect to declarations of
bankruptcy, and procedures for liquidation. The Statute provided a more
detailed description of the duties of the commission responsible for liquida-

24. A reorganization entails the temporary suspension of creditors' claims for a period of time
inwhich the debtor is provided the opportunity to reorganize his operations. The intent of
reorganization is to relieve the debtor's debt burden and provide an opportunity to reestablish the solvency of the enterprise. If the reorganization is successful, the creditors' claims
will then be paid out of the post-bankruptcy earnings of the debtor pursuant to a schedule
approved by the institution administering the bankruptcy.
25. The process of liquidation entails 1) the collection of the assets by a trustee, appointed by
the institution presiding over the bankruptcy, 2) the sale of those assets, 3) the distribution
of the proceeds of the sale to the creditors of the enterprise, and 4) the discharge of the
debtor from liability for pre-bankruptcy debts.
26. Law on State Enterprises, supra note 4, at 56.
27. Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 23, sec. 3, at 65.
28. Id.
29. Law on Enterprises, supra note 6, art. 37, at 81.
30. Law on Enterprises, supra note 6, art. 38, at 82-3.
31. Id. art. 38, at 82-3. This time period may not be less than two months.
32. Russian Law on Enterprises, supra note 8, arts. 37 & 38, at 203-4.
33. Statute on Joint-Stock Companies, supra note 9, arts. 136 & 137, at 223.
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tion, including the appraisal of assets, solicitation of the creditors, and
settlement of accounts.34
The evolution of these laws represents the waning influence of the
centrally planned economy, where enterprises are not expected or permitted
to become bankrupt, and the development of the embryonic stages of an
effective process for liquidating bankrupt enterprises. Although recognizing
the essential duties of bankruptcy administration, they did not fully recognize the concept of a structured reorganization, nor did they enunciate the
necessary procedures for carrying out an effective reorganization or liquidation.
EstablishingCreditors'Rightsand Priority
During the process of either reorganization or liquidation, a primary aim of
the bankruptcy proceeding is to provide a means for ensuring that creditors
receive the maximum repayment possible of their outstanding claims against
the debtor enterprise. In the case of reorganization, bankruptcy proceedings,
attempts to maximize repayment by staying competing creditor claims until
the enterprise is restored to solvency at which time repayment will begin, or
in the case of liquidation, converting and allocating the assets of the debtor in
the most equitable manner. In order to ensure protection of the interests of
creditors, a bankruptcy code must establish the rights of creditors to call for
a bankruptcy and to participate in any bankruptcy proceedings. And, in order
to assure an equitable allocation of assets, the bankruptcy code must establish the priority of payment amongst creditors.
The Law on State Enterprises provided that the bank declaring an enterprise insolvent was also responsible for determining the priority of creditor
payments.35 Additionally, the law provided that citizens' claims and suits
against the enterprise could be brought against the agency responsible for the
creation of the enterprise.36 The Law on Cooperatives provided that when a
cooperative was liquidated by the local soviet of peoples' deputies, "the
claims of its creditors [would] be satisfied under the established procedures."37 The Law on Enterprises provided that creditors' claims would be
satisfied out of the property of the enterprise, and established a class of

34. Id. art. 138, at 223.

35. Law on State Enterprises, supra note 4, art. 18, sec. 3, at 59.
36. Id. art. 23, sec. 2, at 65. This provision retained the aspect of the planned economy by
extending responsibility for an enterprise to the "higher-level agency," which presumably
still directed the operations of the enterprise.
37. Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 23, sec. 3, at 65. Although recognizing the need

for determining priority of creditors, the law did not establish a priority or procedures, but
referred to local procedures which likely did not exist.
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privileged creditors.3 8 Priority would first be given to "the satisfaction of
debts to the budgets [of the State] and to the compensation of expenditures
for the recultivation of lands that had been utilized by the liquidated enterprise. '" 9 The Law on Enterprises also established the important principle of
limiting liability of bankrupt enterprises to creditors by providing that
"claims that have not been satisfied due to an insufficiency of property shall
40
be considered to have been paid off."
The Russian Law on Enterprises replaced the privilege of state debt with
an obligation to employees. This Law created a special class of employee
creditors by declaring that the enterprise must "settle accounts fully with all
workers of the enterprise according to the contracts concluded, irrespective
of the financial state of the enterprise."'4' The Fundamental Principles of
Civil Legislation offered the first attempt at a detailed prioritization of a
settling of accounts: payments in connection with harm to a citizen's health,
payment of workers under labor contract, social insurance/security payments, and finally, payments to other creditors in accordance with legislative
42
acts .
Except for the Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation, the prior acts
evidence an experiment with the creation of various privileged creditors
rather than an actual system of priority amongst creditors. The evolution
away from the concept of a socialist economy toward a market-based
economy is most apparent in this context - with the government first
assigning priority to state debts, then switching to employee contracts, and
then changing to a listing of creditors, with commercial creditors at the
bottom of the list, but nevertheless on the list. Despite the final enunciation
of a priority of creditors in the Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation,
there was as yet no actual consideration of the rights of creditors in the
bankruptcy process.
DischargingDebt Obligations
The final function of bankruptcy is to relieve the honest debtors of oppressive debt and permit them to re-establish their business, or begin a new
business without the continuation of pre-bankruptcy debts. An important
function of a bankruptcy code is therefore to provide that debtors filing for
38. Law on Enterprises, supra note 6, art. 39, at 83.

39. Id.
40. Id. art. 39, sec.3, at 83.
41. Russian Law on Enterprises, supra note 8, at 191. This provision both creates a special
class of privileged creditors and denies the real possibility that an enterprise will be unable
to meet its contractual obligations toward its workers.
42. Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation, supra note 7, art. 17, para. 2, at 108. No acts
existed at the time of adoption indicating the priority of this last category of creditors.
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bankruptcy will receive some protection from creditors, either a short-term
stay of debt payment obligations in the case of a reorganization or a
discharge of debt obligations in the case of a liquidation.
The Law on Enterprises was the first act to discuss the discharge of debt
obligations, providing that "claims that have not been satisfied due to an
insufficiency of property shall be considered to have been paid off."43 The
Russian Law on Enterprises, however, required the entrepreneur to "settle
accounts fully with all workers of the enterprise according to the contracts
'44
concluded, irrespective of the financial state of the enterprise.
The Law on Enterprises eventually recognized the need to discharge the
debt of the enterprise after a bankruptcy, but the Russian Law on Enterprises
reverted back to the socialist principle that employee compensation contracts must be fulfilled regardless of the financial situation of the enterprise.
Although western bankruptcy proceedings frequently designate the employees as privileged creditors, they provide that in the case where the debtor is
unable to meet such contractual obligations, these may be discharged.

2. The Search for a Comprehensive Bankruptcy Law
MaturingNeedfor New Bankruptcy Legislation
Facing the continuing unraveling of the Soviet economy, many economists
and law-makers believed that the above legislation was insufficient and that
more comprehensive bankruptcy legislation would be required to help
stabilize the move toward a market-based economy. One commentator noted
in 1990 that within the Soviet government, "there is a general belief that
many of the newly created private and mixed enterprises will fail and that if
and when that happens there will be a need to protect the interests of the
creditors of such insolvent organizations. ' '4 At that time, the Soviet Union
was conducting a study of bankruptcy laws in leading commercial nations,
and it was anticipated that a new bankruptcy law might be passed as early as
the end of 1990.46 Yet, strong political and ideological opposition to
Gorbachev's key economic legislation delayed the formulation of any comprehensive bankruptcy law until after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
During the first year after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the
economic crisis in Russia showed no signs of improving. In an April 1992
interview with Komsomol'skaiapravda,the Russian Minister of Economics,
43.
44.
45.
46.

Law on Enterprises, supra note 6, art. 39, sec. 3, at 83.
Russian Law on Enterprises, supra note 8, art. 17, at 191.
Osakwe, supra note 2, at 12-9.
Id.
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Andrei Nechaev, argued that the deepening economic crisis in Russia would
require new thinking and a greater understanding of a market-based economy.47
Asked if this could only occur after a general economic collapse, Nechaev
responded, "Why should we wait for a general collapse? It should be enough
to arrange ten different instructive bankruptcies. So that producers will
finally realize that it is better to lower prices and slightly diminish the
appetite ...
than to be left with empty hands."48 He added that this was
unlikely, however, as there was no bankruptcy law in Russia.4 9
By this time, though, other Russian officials were becoming increasingly
aware of the problem of bankrupt enterprises. At the end of May 1992,
Georgii Matiukhin, Chairman of the Russian Central Bank, warned Parliament that within three months the reciprocal debts of enterprises could reach
two million rubles, but that figure was reached barely a month later.5 0 In a 2
July 1992 interview concerning the economic crisis in Russia, S. Nikitin,
Deputy Chief Accountant of the Russian Central Bank declared that "those
enterprises which are running at a loss -that is, enterprises which are making
goods which are not in demand - can be declared bankrupt."'" He suggested
52
issuing stock as a means to attract resources and escape bankruptcy.
Spurred on by such forecasts, the Russian Parliament began to debate a
law on bankruptcy, continuing the search for a comprehensive bankruptcy
law begun under the previous regime. President El'tsin preempted the
development of this legislation on 14 June 1992 by issuing an edict on
"Measures for Support and Restructuring of Insolvent State Enterprises
(Bankrupts) with Application of Special Procedures."53
The Interim Edict on Insolvent State Enterprises
El'tsin's Presidential edict, despite its limited application to state enterprises, marked the first attempt to implement a comprehensive bankruptcy
law since the beginning of the move to a market-based economy.
The edict set forth a detailed definition of bankruptcy:
47. I. Savvateyeva, "We Don't Need Great Upheavals: 10 Instructive Bankruptcies Will be
Enough", 15 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 13 (1992) translating from
Komsomol 'skaiapravda 2 (9 April 1992).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50, "Bank Official Comments on Enterprise Debts", ForeignBroadcastInformation Service
58 (9 July 1992), translating Moscow Russian Television Network, 1900 GMT, 2 July
1992.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Measures for Support and Restructuring of Insolvent State Enterprises (Bankrupts) with
Application of Special Procedures, Russian Federation President's Edict No.623 (14 June
1992) (WESTLAW, Rus.Legis.) [hereinafter Presidential Edict].
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nonfulfillment for three months of state budget obligations, failure to
satisfy creditor claims within three months of maturity, and debt amounting to twice the enterprise's assets. 4
Bankruptcy determinations were to be made by the committee for property
management from the state agency owning the enterprise,55 with the possibility that creditors or the enterprise itself could request that the committee
examine the possibility of declaring bankruptcy. 6 A determination would be
rendered within one month after opening bankruptcy proceedings as to
whether the state enterprise was deemed solvent or bankrupt. 7
If financially possible, the committee was required to adopt a program for
restructuring the state enterprise." The actual restructuring (reorganization)
would be directed by an "independent entrepreneur" selected through competitive bidding, and given six to eighteen months to restore solvency to the
enterprise. 9 This bidding process would be open to foreign entrepreneurs.6"
Although the reorganization authority would be given all rights to administer the enterprise, including appointment or discharge of employees, and
the right to dispose of assets,6' the edict placed a number of potentially
untenable constraints on any such reorganization. The reorganization authority was required to retain seventy percent of the work force, guarantee
social protection for employees, "including mandatory assurance of redun'62
dant employees of their rights and interests.
If the reorganization authority was successful in its attempts to restore
financial health to the state enterprise, as determined by the state committee,
the state of bankruptcy would be terminated, 63 and the entrepreneur became
the new owner of the enterprise. 6 If the enterprise was not financially viable,
or was declared bankrupt again within one year of the reorganization, the
54. Id. at sec. 2. It is unclear from the text whether a debtor must satisfy all three or just one of
these criteria to be considered bankrupt.
55. Id. at sec. 3.
56. Id. at sec. 4.
57. Id. at sec. 7.
58. Id. at sec. 10.
59. Id. at sec. iI.
60. Id.
61. Id. at sec. 14.
62. Id. The edict also required the repayment of debt, and the protection of ecological safety
during restructuring. Id.
63. Id. at sec. 19.
64. Id. at sec. 20. It is unclear from the text of the edict whether the entrepreneur must purchase
the enterprise, or whether the entrepreneur is entitled to the enterprise as payment for the
service of restoring the enterprise to solvency. If the entrepreneur is required to infuse
capital into the enterprise as part of the reorganization, then this would be considered a
bailout proceeding.
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property committee would liquidate the enterprise, 65 with the control over
the enterprise and its assets passing to the property committee.6 6 At this
point, the property committee was required to liquidate the enterprise and
6
prepare the enterprise and/or its assets for saleY.
Bidders for the enterprise were required to purchase the enterprise in its
entirety, accept the obligations of the enterprise, and commit to ensure the
social guarantees, rights and interests of the enterprise employees. 68 Bidders
were also required to maintain the core activity of the enterprise, and retain
seventy percent of the work force. 69 If the enterprise was not purchased in its
entirety, its assets were to be offered for sale individually.70
Notably, the edict did not address the issue of creditors' rights. Although
creditors had the opportunity to request that the property committee consider
bankruptcy, they did not have a right to formally initiate bankruptcy proceedings independently of the property committee. Similarly, the edict made
no provision for participation of the creditors in the process of determining
the bankruptcy, reorganization, or the liquidation of the enterprise.7 And,
probably most important, the edict did not provide for a priority amongst the
creditors, but rather provided a general listing of how the proceeds from any
liquidation were to be distributed.72
The second major flaw of the edict is that it did not provide for an
independent body to determine the financial state of the enterprise. State
property committees were unlikely to declare an enterprise bankrupt, since
doing so would lead to the consequence of either the enterprise being
liquidated or transferred to the ownership of a private entrepreneur. In either
case, the state agency would lose control over the enterprise.
Despite these weaknesses, the Presidential edict was welcomed by the
Minister of Economics as a legal basis for beginning the process of liquidating unprofitable state enterprises.73 The Minister emphasized that the edict
should serve as a warning to Russian businessmen and executives so they
would realize the extent of their personal financial responsibility for the

65. Id. at sec. 22.
66. Id. at sec. 23.
67. Id.
68. Id. at sec. 24.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. The edict does provide creditors with a two-month time frame to file claims after the
property committee determines to liquidate an enterprise. Id. at sec. 23.
72. This listing includes obligations to the budget, claims of creditors, redundancy payments
to enterprise employees, and "other mandatory payments." Id. at sec. 25.
73. "About the President's Decree on Bankruptcy", 24 The CurrentDigest of the Post-Soviet
Press I I (1992) translating Rossiiskie vesti (19 June 1992).
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problem of nonpayment of debt.74 However, despite the proclamation of the
edict, the problem of enterprise bankruptcy continued to steadily grow. On
19 November 1992 the Russian Parliament responded to this looming crisis
and enacted the Russian Federation Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of Enterprises
Act.75

3. Adoption of the Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of Enterprises Act
The Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of Enterprises Act (hereinafter the Insolvency
Act) aspires to establish the legal basis for reorganization of bankrupt
enterprises, and voluntary or involuntary liquidation of bankrupt enterprises
where reorganization measures are economically infeasible or have proved
unsuccessful.7 6 The Insolvency Act attempts to achieve this goal particularly
by both establishing the preconditions and procedures for determining
bankruptcy and establishing the order of priority for the payment of creditors' claims.77
The Insolvency Act and the Five Functionsof a Bankruptcy Code
The Insolvency Act specifically addresses all five functions of a bankruptcy
code in its attempt to create a comprehensive system of bankruptcy.
1) Defining bankruptcy. The Insolvency Act provides that an enterprise,
state or private, may be deemed bankrupt upon a determination that it is
incapable of meeting creditors' claims to payment for goods or services,
including statutorily required payments into the budget and "off-budget
funds," as a result of the debtor's obligations being in excess of its assets, or
74. Id. Not all commentators accepted the premise that substantial numbers of Russian enterprises were poised for bankruptcy. Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Anatolii Chubais
claimed that approximately ten to twenty percent of Russian enterprises were bankrupt,
not the eighty percent figure proposed by some. "Denies 80 Percent of Enterprises Bankrupt", ForeignBroadcastInformation Service 17 (17 November 1992) translating Moscow Interfax, 1332 GMT, (15 November 1992) [hereinafter "Denies Enterprises Bankrupt"]. Although accepting the possibility that some bankrupt enterprises existed, the
Deputy Prime Minister minimized their significance, stating that "Russia will have to face
the possibility that newly privatized enterprises will go bankrupt. However, this will pose
no tragedy for the stockholders, because if the worst comes to worst, they'll still own the
property of their enterprises, which they can sell and receive a dividend in this way." Id.
75. Russian Federation Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of Enterprises Act, Russian Federation Act
No.3929-1, Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree No.3930-1, (19 November 1992)
(WESTLAW, Rus. Legis.) [hereinafter Insolvency Act].
76. Id.
77. Maria Kuzmenkova, "Bankruptcy Law for Enterprises Approved", Moscow ITAR-TASS,
1355 GMT (12 November 1992) translated in ForeignBroadcastInformation Service 27
(17 November 1992).
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as a result of an "unsatisfactory structure of the debtor's balance sheet."78
The objective indication of bankruptcy is the suspension of payments to
creditors for a period of three months.7 9
This definition of bankruptcy combines the two indicia of insolvency,
non-payment of debt and debt in excess of assets, to require a fairly high
threshold for the declaration of bankruptcy. Although the Act retains some of
the ambiguity of previous acts by referring to the condition of "unsatisfactory structure of the debtor's balance sheet" as a possible basis upon which to
determine bankruptcy, the act does provide the objective standard of a
suspension of payments to creditors for a period of three months. This latter
criteria will likely be the most actively used basis for initiating bankruptcy
proceedings.
2) Determining insolvency. Unlike previous legislation, the Insolvency
Act provides that an enterprise may be declared bankrupt either voluntarily
or involuntarily by a court of arbitration.8" The determination of insolvency
may be sought either by the debtor enterprise, or the creditor(s). 1 The debtor
enterprise may file a request for a determination of insolvency and subsequent voluntary liquidation of its assets.8 2 Once the debtor has filed such a
petition, it may not be revoked.83 A creditor of the enterprise may after
nonpayment of debt for three months, and after service of notice requesting
payment, file a petition for determination of bankruptcy and reorganization
of the enterprise.84 The creditor may not at first seek liquidation of the
enterprise.85 The creditor may revoke its petition prior to the commencement
86
of bankruptcy proceedings.
Once a petition has been filed, the arbitration court shall conduct a
hearing to determine whether the enterprise is indeed bankrupt. The court is
required to consider evidence and opinions from the debtor enterprise, local
financial agency, banks providing settlement and credit services to the
88
debtor, creditors, and representatives of the enterprise's work collective.
78. Insolvency Act, supra note 75, art. 1.
79. Id.

80. Id. art. 1.
81. Id. art. 4. The procurator may also file a petition for bankruptcy in cases of fraudulent or
fictitious bankruptcy. Id. art. 7, sec. 1.
82. Id. art. 4, secs. 1 & 2.
83. Id. art. 4, sec. 6. The rational for this requirement being that a debtor could forestall
payment of debt by frequently filing and then withdrawing petitions for bankruptcy.
84. Id. art. 6, sec. 1.
85. Id.
86. The rational being that the creditor may successfully use the threat of bankruptcy proceedings to acquire payment of debt.
87. Id. art. 10, sec. 1.
88. Id.
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The court shall then determine the enterprise to be either solvent and dismiss
the suit, or insolvent and initiate bankruptcy proceedings.8 9
By providing a specific procedure for the filing of bankruptcy petitions
and the adjudication of such petitions, the Insolvency Act creates a clear and
identifiable process for seeking determinations of bankruptcy. The existence
of this open process will facilitate the ability of debtors and creditors to
utilize the bankruptcy process, and thereby encourage use of the bankruptcy
system.
3) Establishing a process for reorganization or liquidation. After a
determination of bankruptcy, the court may initiate either a reorganization or
a liquidation. Reorganization may be either in the form of receivership or
bailout. The court may also confirm a composition.
The court is permitted to initiate a receivership only if there is a "real
possibility of recovery of solvency by debtor." 90 Upon making this determination, the court appoints a receiver to take control of the operation and
assets of the enterprise, 9' with the purpose of restoring solvency through the
sale of part of its assets and any other organizational and economic measures
necessary. 9 The period of receivership lasts for a maximum period of
eighteen months, 93 during which time a moratorium is placed on all creditor
claims against the debtor. 94 If the owner of the enterprise or its creditors
believe the operation of the enterprise by the receiver harms their interests,
they may petition the court to review the receiver's operational plan.95
At such time as appropriate, but within eighteen months, the receiver
either informs the court that the enterprise has been restored to solvency or
that it is not possible to restore the enterprise to solvency. 96 The court may

89. Id. art. 10, sec. 2.
90. Id. art. 12, sec. 2.
91. Id. art. 12, sec. 4. The receiver must be an economist or a lawyer, or must have business
experience and no criminal record. Id.
92. Id. art. 12, sec. 2. The receiver shall have the authority to operate as senior executive of the
enterprise; dismiss other senior executives; lay off personnel, in accordance with Russian
labor legislation; dispose of assets; convene creditors' meetings; and draft and implement
a plan for returning the enterprise to solvency. Id. art. 12, sec. 6. The receiver is not
constrained by obligations to retain a specific percentage of the work force, or to ensure
continuation of social benefits, as was the case with the El'tsin Presidential edict. See
supra note 53, and accompanying text.
93. Insolvency Act, supra note 75, art. 12, sec. 2.
94. Id. art. 12, sec. 3.
95. Id. art. 12, sec. 10.
96. Id. art. 12, sec. 11.
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then terminate receivership (if solvent), 9 or initiate liquidation proceedings. 98
As with receivership, a bailout is permitted only after the court has
determined that there is a real possibility the enterprise can be made solvent
through the extension of financial assistance.9 9 The owner of the debtor
enterprise, creditors, and members of the enterprise's work collective have
the priority right to perform the bailout of the enterprise. 100
Once an offer to bail out the enterprise has been tendered, participants in
the bailout must work out an agreement providing for payment of creditor
claims by specific deadlines,'0 ' but no later than eighteen months. °2 Participants in the bailout are held jointly and severally liable for the debt of the
enterprise, unless provided otherwise in the agreement. 03 The court then
approves the bailout agreement, and the bailout will commence. 1°4 If during
the course of the bailout, the owner of the enterprise or its creditors believe
the bailout is ineffective or harms their interests, they may petition the court
to review the operation of the bailout. 05 The court may then terminate the
bailout or render any appropriate decisions. 106
At such time as is appropriate, but no later than the prescribed eighteen
months, the court may declare the bailout successful and terminate the
bankruptcy proceedings, or the court may declare the bailout ineffective and
render a decision on the solvency of the debtor, which will then likely lead to
liquidation proceedings.'0 7
The purpose of liquidation proceedings is the "proportional satisfaction
of creditors' claims and discharge of debtor from debt, and also the ...
protection [of] the parties from wrongful acts with respect to each other."'0 8

97. Although the Insolvency Act does not indicate the disposition of the enterprise after
termination of receivership, it appears the intent is to return the management and ownership of the enterprise back to the original owners. This differs significantly from the
El'tsin edict where the receiver was granted ownership of the state enterprise after restoring solvency.
98. Id. art. 12, sec. 10.
99. Id. art. 13, sec. 2.
100. Id. art. 13, sec. 1. If the priority bailors do not exercise their right, the bailout will be open
to all legal persons, including foreign persons. Id. art. 13, sec. 4.
101. Id. art. 13, sec. 7. The agreement must provide that not later than twelve months past the
commencement of the bailout, forty percent of the total claims of the creditors must be
met. Id.
102.Id. art. 13, sec. 9.
103.Id. art. 13, sec. 7.
104.Id. art. 13, sec. 8.
105.3d. art. 13, sec. 10.
106.Id.
107.Id. art. 13, secs. I1 & 12.
108.4d. art. 15.
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The court initiates liquidation proceedings in the event a debtor requests
liquidation, or is deemed insolvent and recourse to receivership or bailout
has not been successful.
Upon commencement of liquidation proceedings, all debt payments are
suspended, and all debt obligations matured. 0 9 The court then appoints a
bankruptcy trustee" 0 who collects, values,"' and takes legal title, in trust, to
the assets of the enterprise," 2 and recognizes or rejects creditors' claims." 3
The trustee then liquidates the assets through the formation of a liquidation
committee." 4 From the revenue generated through liquidation, the trustee
pays the claims of the creditors in the priority specified in the Insolvency
the payment
Act." 5 Any objections to the activities of the trustee, including
6
court."
the
by
adjudicated
be
may
claims
of creditors'
At any stage of the bankruptcy proceedings, the parties may agree to a
composition and submit it to the court for approval." 7 The composition will
be approved if it is supported by two-thirds of the creditors in value," 8 and
where the composition does not create conditions unfavorable to those
creditors opposing composition." 9 Within two weeks of confirmation of
composition by the court, the creditors must receive at least thirty-five
percent satisfaction of their exposure to the debtor. 20 The composition may
be rescinded at any time, either by agreement of the parties or by ruling of the
court, in instances where the composition is not executed, the financial
condition of the debtor continues to deteriorate, or where the debtor has
infringed upon the creditors' rights and legitimate interests. 2' If the composition is rescinded, the matter is returned23to the bankruptcy proceedings,'2 2
and the claims of creditors are renewed.'
The Insolvency Act overcomes the deficiencies of the earlier attempts at
a bankruptcy code by providing a detailed and fair process for reorganiza109.1d. art. 18.
110. The senior executives of the enterprise shall be dismissed, and the trustee shall assume
their authority. Id. art. 24.
111.Id. art. 26, sec. 2.

112. These assets shall not include housing stock, child-welfare institutions, and infrastructure
facilities vital to the community. Id. art. 26, sec. 1.
113.Id. art. 21, sec. 1.
114.Id. art. 21, sec. 1; and art. 34.

115. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
116. Insolvency Act, supra note 75, art. 31.
117.Id. art. 39; and art. 41, sec. 2.
118.Id. art. 41, sec. 2.
119.Id. art. 40, sec. 2.
120.Id. art.
12 1.Id. art.
122.Id. art.
123.1d. art.

42,
43,
43,
43,

sec.
sec.
sec.
sec.

4.
2.
2.
4.
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tion, liquidation, or composition. The one potential flaw in this process,
however, is the appointment of a receiver in the case of reorganization.
Because the Insolvency Act does not provide for a reorganization controlled
by the owner, two distinct problems may arise. First, the owner will be less
likely to invoke voluntary bankruptcy proceedings as this will entail relinquishing control of the enterprise for up to eighteen months. Secondly, the
Act assumes the enterprise is in bankruptcy because of mismanagement,
whereas the cause might be a general economic decline, or the accidental
accumulation of excessive debt. In this event, the owner is likely to be in as
good, or better, a position to reorganize the enterprise and restore solvency.
4) Establishingcreditors' rights andpriority. The Insolvency Act establishes a number of avenues for creditors to protect their interests during the
bankruptcy proceedings, and establishes a detailed priority for the payment
of creditor claims.
In all bankruptcy proceedings the debtor is required to file specific
information with the court which is necessary for creditors in order to protect
their interests. This information includes: the total amount of unsatisfied
claims, the assets of the enterprise, current balance sheet (including payables
and receivables), and the reason for the inability to meet creditors' claims.'24
In cases of reorganization, creditors are entitled to propose nominees for
receiver, 2 ' determine the compensation of the receiver, 2 6 form a creditors'
committee with the power to request information from the receiver, and
confirm or amend the plan for official receivership.2 7 In the case of bailout
proceedings, as discussed above, the creditors are entitled to a priority option
to participate in the bailout, 28 and are entitled to have their claims paid in
full.

129

In cases of liquidation, creditors are entitled: to preservation of the
debtors assets by prohibiting the sale of those assets after commencement of
the liquidation proceedings; 30 to form a creditors' committee with the right
to make nominations for the bankruptcy trustee; determine the trustee's
compensation; authorize the trustee to dispose of the debtors' assets; and
approve any compositions.' In the event a creditor's claim is rejected by the
124. Id. art. 5, secs. 2 & 3.
125.Id. art. 12, sec. 4.
126.Id. art. 12, sec. 5.
127. Id. art. 12, secs. 7, 8, & 9. Representatives of the enterprise's work collective are permitted to attend creditor committee meetings. Id. art. 12, sec. 9.
128.Id. art. 13, sec. 1.
129.1d. art. 13, sec. 7.
130.Id. art. 18.
131. Id. art. 23, sec. 2. In the event of a composition, individual debtors, whether or not they
voted in favor of the composition, may object to the composition before the court. Id. art.
42, sec. 3.
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trustee, the creditor may petition the court to review this rejection. 31 2 Through
the trustee, the creditors may seek to have payments made to other creditors
six months prior to the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings declared null and
void and returned to the assets of the enterprise, if those payments were made
at a time when the enterprise was effectively insolvent.'33
In order to protect creditors from wrongful acts of the debtor, the
Insolvency Act provides that it shall be illegal to: 1) create a fraudulent or
fictitious bankruptcy; 3 4 2) conceal assets or obligations, make false entries
in bookkeeping documents, or alienate property purchased on credit in
anticipation of bankruptcy proceedings; or 3) conceal from the trustee
information regarding previous transfer of enterprise assets, valuation of
assets, and location and control of assets, after bankruptcy proceedings have
begun.135

The Insolvency Act establishes a priority for claims along the following
lines: 1) expenses incidental to the bankruptcy proceedings, 2) personal
injury claims, 3) a) claims for labor remuneration, including pension fund
and benefit payments, and b) copyright and licensing fees, 4) mandatory
payments into budget and off-budget funds, 5) standard creditor claims, 6)
claims of work collectives with an ownership interest in the enterprise, 7)
claims of other owners, and 8) all other claims.'36 Claims for each order of
37
priority shall be fully satisfied before claims of the next priority are paid.
In the event assets are not sufficient to satisfy the claims of all the creditors
in a given category, the claims will be satisfied in proportion to the sum due
to each of the creditors. 3 '
The Insolvency Act represents a substantial success for creditors. The
detailed articulation of creditors' rights and priority suffers from only a few
minor defects. Though the Act attempts to prohibit wrongful acts on the part
of the debtor, these acts are punishable as criminal offenses, but do constitute
a ground for denying the discharge of the debtor's debt obligations. Although
132.Id. art. 27. The creditor may also petition the court to review a determination of the
priority of a creditor's claim. Id.
133.Id. art. 28. If the payments where made with the intention of causing loss to other
creditors, and the receiving creditors were aware of this action, the payments may be
declared null and void regardless of the six-month time frame. Id.
134. A fraudulent bankruptcy is defined as the "deliberate creation or increase of insolvency of
enterprise by executive or owner, infliction of loss on enterprise for personal gain or for
the gain of other persons, or deliberately incompetent management of business." Id.
preamble. A fictitious bankruptcy is defined as the "deliberately false announcement of
insolvency by enterprise with the aim of misleading creditors to obtain postponement
and/or deferment of payments due to creditors, or reduction of debt." Id.
135.Id. arts. 44, 45, & 46.
136. Id. art. 30, sec. 2.
137. Id. art. 30, sec. 3.
138. Id. art. 30, sec. 4.
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in some instances a credible threat of criminal liability may be a sufficient
deterrent from wrongful acts, it is located outside of the bankruptcy proceedings, and not available as a tool for the creditor to prompt full and fair
disclosure of assets. Denial of discharge would provide the creditors with the
necessary leverage.
The listing of creditors is comprehensive and fair, but fails to establish
limits on the amounts which may be sought under priority claims. For
instance, by failing to place a limit on the amount of employee compensation, owners or executives may circumvent the rights of creditors by paying
out substantially all of the proceeds to top executives as employee compensation. Additionally, there are no penalties for tardy filing by creditors, and
there is no provision for equitable subordination of creditor claims.
5) Dischargingdebt obligations.Recognizing the need to provide debtors
with a clean slate to begin business anew, the Insolvency Act provides both
that creditors' claims not satisfied for lack of enterprise assets will be
deemed discharged, 3 9 and that the debtor will be deemed fully released from
further liability for those debt obligations settled within the bankruptcy
proceedings. 140 Additionally, at the time liquidation proceedings commence,
the accrual of all penalty and interest payments will be terminated, and any
claims on the property of the debtor must be made within the liquidation
proceedings. 141
The debt discharge provisions of the Insolvency Act are sufficient to
encourage debtors to seek voluntary bankruptcy proceedings and to ensure
that debtors will be able to start an enterprise anew without the continuation
of cumbersome debt obligations.
Prospectsfor the Effective Utilizationof the Insolvency Act
The enactment of the Insolvency Act has established a firm basis for the
functioning of an efficient bankruptcy system in Russia. The adoption of the
Insolvency Act is, however, only the first step in the successful utilization of
bankruptcy to facilitate the effective operation of a market-based economy
in Russia. A number of obstacles must be overcome before the Russian
bankruptcy system will be fully operable. These obstacles include: the
creation of a reservoir of trained individuals to arbitrate claims of bankruptcy, administer bankrupt companies, and liquidate assets;' 42 the enact-

139.Id. art. 35, sec. 3.
140.Id. art. 36.
141.Id. art. 18.
142. J. Rotowski, "The Inter-enterprise Debt Explosion in the Former Soviet Union: Causes,
Consequences, Cures", 5 Communist Economies & Economic Transformation 1993,
135, 155.
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ment of a number of necessary accompanying acts, such as statutes on price
indexation, and the indexation of the value of the property of enterprises; 43
and alleviation of the public fear and misconception concerning bankruptcies.
Recognizing these obstacles, the Russian government has already made
substantial progress in creating the necessary support for an effective bankruptcy system. In order to create the necessary reservoir of trained experts,
the Supreme Soviet decree enacting the bankruptcy law directed the government to establish a system for training official receivers and bankruptcy
trustees from among experienced business managers and qualified lawyers
and economists, and to draft a statute creating a federal agency for bankruptcy affairs.' In response to this decree, on 27 November 1992 the
Supreme Soviet issued a new decree strengthening the arbitration courts. Its
provisions included the budgeting for official trips of arbitration courtjudges
to study "the practice of bankruptcy cases and the resolution of economic
disputes" abroad, as well as inviting foreign specialists to Russia to set up
training courses.' 45
Attempting to alleviate public fear concerning adoption of the bankruptcy
law, the chief consultant to the Higher Court of Arbitration assured business
leaders that the court would give preference to reorganization over liquidation of an insolvent enterprise. 46 Similarly, one of the law's primary drafters
asserted that "a wave of bankruptcy is not eminent, especially since mechanisms for supporting and improving enterprises that are necessary to the
national economy are to be set in motion.' 4 7
With the filing of the first successful Russian bankruptcy in September of
1993 involving the Zvezda knife factory, there is now a model upon which to
build future bankruptcy proceedings. 48 Hopefully the success of the Zvezda
reorganization will allay public fears about bankruptcy and encourage both
creditors and debtors to seek the economic tool of bankruptcy to facilitate the

143. "Supreme Soviet Discusses Bankruptcy Law, Referendum", Moscow Radio Rossia Network, 1990 GMT (2 February 1993) translated in ForeignBroadcastInformationService
at 28 (3 February 1993).
144. Presidential edict, supra note 53, at sec. 3(a).
145. "Decree on Strengthening of Arbitration Courts", Rossiiskaiagazeta at 5 (17 December
1992), translated in Foreign BroadcastInformation Service at 28-9 (29 January 1993).
146. Irina Demchenko, "Law on Bankruptcy To Go Into Effect Soon", Izvestiia at 2 (4 February 1993) translated in 5 The CurrentDigest of the Post-Soviet Press 21 (1993).
147.Id.
148. For a description of the process of filing the Zvezda bankruptcy see "CEELI Helps File
First Russian Bankruptcy", CentralandEast EuropeanLaw Initiative (CEELI) Update 1
(July-September 1993).
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restructuring of their economic relations on the basis of free market prin149
ciples.

4. Conclusion
The current Russian Insolvency Act represents the result of Russia's gradual
recognition of the need for bankruptcy provisions in a market-based economy
and reflects the steady evolution of Russian legislation away from the
principles of a command economy and toward free market principles. The
Insolvency Act is the product of a serious effort on the part of Russian
lawmakers to understand the needs of a market-based economy and the
interrelationship of the different components of such a system. As such, the
Act represents a bankruptcy code that comprehensively addresses the five
primary functions of bankruptcy, and thereby establishes a solid basis for an
effective bankruptcy system. As Russia continues to experience the pains of
transition to a market-based economy, its new bankruptcy system will likely
play a key role in increasing enterprise efficiency, protecting creditors'
rights, discharging onerous debt obligations, and reallocating limited capital.

149. Unfortunately, in discussing the Zvezda case, A. Kozlov, Director of the Nizhegorod
Oblast's Department of Economics and Forecasting, noted that "in the majority of cases,
bankruptcy proceedings may end such that managers will be replaced and special-purpose credits will be extended." "Pervoe v Rossii delo o bankrotstve zavoda rassmatrivaetsia
v arbitrazhnom sude" (The First Case in Russia of a Factory Bankruptcy is Considered in
Arbitration Court), Izvestiia, 27 August 1993, 2. The struggle between the centrallyplanned economy of Russia's communist past and the free market economy it hopes to
build continues. For recent reports on the proceedings of the Zvezda reorganization, see
Judith Ingram, "Russian Company Tests New Bankruptcy Law", New York Times 50 (25
December 1993); and Elizabeth Rubinfien, "Russia Puts Bankruptcy Law to Work, but
First Searches for Best Test Case", Wall Street Journal 11 (12 November 1993).

